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Evaluating the Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on Employees: 
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data  
 
Abstract 
  The unit of analysis in empirical studies of the employment and wage effects of mergers and 
acquisitions is typically the plant or firm.  In contrast, the unit of observation in this study is the 
individual worker, which allows us to provide direct, systematic empirical evidence on the effects of 
different types of mergers and acquisitions on employees.  Specifically, we analyze linked employer-
employee data for the entire population of Swedish workers and over 19,000 manufacturing plants 
for the period 1985-1998.  For each worker, we have data on gender, age, national origin, level of 
education, type of education, location, industrial sector, annual earnings, as well as each employee’s 
complete work history both before and after a merger or acquisition.  We can also identify whether 
the plant was involved in a full or partial acquisition or divestiture, as well as a related or unrelated 
acquisition.  The empirical evidence suggests that employee outcomes are more favorable when only 
part of the company is bought or sold or when the firm engages in an unrelated acquisition.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are contrasting views on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on employees.  In a 
highly influential article, Shleifer and Summers (1988) conjectured that mergers and acquisitions 
constitute a transfer of wealth from workers to shareholders.  According to the authors, this occurs 
because acquirers do not honor implicit contracts with employees concerning wages and benefits.  
Thus, in their view, the abrogation of these commitments enables the new owners of the company to 
use the deal as a mechanism for enhancing the profitability of the firm, and ultimately, shareholder 
wealth,  at  the  expense  of  workers.    Others  have  alleged  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  lead  to 
substantial downsizing or even mass layoffs, usually basing their conclusions on data from a small 
number of large, publicly-traded corporations.  Such layoffs have been alleged to have a traumatic, 
lasting negative impact on workers who are fired and also on “survivors,” or those who remain with 
the firm in the aftermath of the layoff (Brockner et al. (1987), Brockner (1988)).   
On the other hand, some economic theories predict that mergers and acquisitions can benefit 
workers.  This allegedly occurs because the transaction constitutes a mechanism for stimulating 
additional  investment  in  human  capital  and  promoting  “skill  upgrading”  of  the  workforce, 
particularly if these transactions result in the implementation of new technologies.   For example, 
Jovanovic  and  Rousseau  (2002,  2004)  conjecture  that  high  quality  managers  and  high  quality 
projects  are  complements.    Moreover,  they  assert  that  takeovers  result  in  the  diffusion  of  new 
technologies and the reallocation of capital to more efficient uses and to better managers.   An 
empirical  implication  of  their  model  is  that  technological  change  and  ownership  change  are 
complements, which implies that these transactions should lead to some job reduction (e.g., labor-  4 
saving technological innovations), but also “skill upgrading” and wage increases for employees that 
remain with the firm.
1     
Several authors have examined the employment and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions 
(e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a, 1990b), McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), Conyon et al. 
(2002a, 2002b, 2004), and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)).  However, the unit of observation in such 
studies is typically the plant or firm.  In contrast, the unit of analysis in this study is the individual 
worker, which allows us to provide direct, systematic empirical evidence on the effects of ownership 
change on worker outcomes.  The use of data on individual workers is quite useful, since an ability 
to track workers who are involved in a merger or acquisition might allow us to discriminate between 
the alternative theories mentioned earlier.  We are also able to disaggregate these effects for different 
types of mergers and acquisitions.   
While there has been some attention in the management and finance literatures devoted to 
assessing the consequences of mergers and acquisitions for top-level managers (e.g., CEOs), there 
has  been  little  analysis  of  the  effects  of  such  events  on  other  types  of  employees.      It  is  also 
important to note that much of the empirical work on this topic has been based on non-representative 
samples of corporate control changes and companies, typically, full-firm mergers and acquisitions of 
publicly-traded companies.  That is unfortunate, since it is well known that most ownership changes 
involve privately-held companies and that these transactions occur below the firm level (e.g., the 
sale of an individual plant or division of a company).   
  In this paper, we address these gaps in the literature on the labor market consequences of 
mergers and acquisitions.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the following 
                                                 
1 A review of the literature on skill-biased technological change” in Siegel (1999) reveals that technological change is 
associated  with  downsizing  and  skill-upgrading  of  the  workforce.  Bresnahan,  Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  (2002)  present 
evidence on the connection among technological change, organizational change, and organizational performance.   5 
section, we review some recent studies of the employment and wage effects of ownership change.  
Section III outlines our econometric methods.  Section IV describes the data.  Section V presents 
empirical results.  Section VI contains conclusions.     
 
II. RECENT STUDIES OF THE EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS OF MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS  
 
  Table  1  summarizes  some  recent  studies  of  the  impact  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  on 
employment and compensation.  There appears to be no strong consensus on the overall effects on 
workers, although most of the empirical evidence appears to contradict the Shleifer and Summers 
hypothesis.    For  instance,  several  studies  based  on  plant-level  data  conclude  that  mergers  and 
acquisitions do not lead to significant declines in levels of employment and wages for production 
workers.  In fact, the paper by McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), which is based on the entire Census of 
Manufactures data for selected industries, actually finds that wages and employment increase at 
production establishments after a merger or acquisition.  Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a) compare 
employee outcomes at production and “central office” establishments in the aftermath of ownership 
change, where central office establishments are typically a corporate or divisional headquarters.  The 
authors report that growth rates of employment and wages are lower in central office establishments 
after a merger or acquisition, implying that white-collar employees suffer more than production 
workers in the aftermath of such transactions.  
However, it is important to note that these effects may also vary depending on the type of 
corporate control change.  Using firm-level data, Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a) 
reported that U.K. mergers resulted in a reduction in wages and compensation of non-production 
workers.  The authors also find greater declines in employment associated with related mergers,   6 
relative to those associated with unrelated mergers.
2  In a follow-up to this study, Conyon, Girma, 
Thompson, and Wright (2004)), the authors reported that wage increases tend to follow mergers, 
especially related mergers.  Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) analyzed the employment effects of U.S. 
and European mergers, concluding that there is a 10% decline in labor demand in the aftermath of 
mergers involving European firms.  Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that slightly less than 
half of the companies involved in hostile takeovers institute worker layoffs, which affect about 6% 
of their workforce. Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2007) report that Swedish manufacturing plants 
involved in mergers and acquisitions experience lasting employment reductions of about 10%, with 
the largest reductions occurring for full acquisitions and divestitures and the smallest occurring for 
related-industry mergers and acquisitions.
3 
Some scholars have examined labor market outcomes following leveraged and management 
buyouts (henceforth, LBO and MBO).  Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990b) analyze U.S. plant-level data 
and  find  that  manufacturing  plants  involved  in  an  LBO  or  MBO  experience  a  decline  in  the 
employment and wages of non-production workers.  However, the authors also find that similar 
patterns do not emerge for production workers.  Based on U.K. plant-level data, Harris, Siegel, and 
Wright (2005) report that MBOs result in a reduction in the labor intensity of production.    
Several studies have directly examined the effects of takeovers on the compensation of non-
executive employees.  Contrary to Shleifer and Summers (1988), Mitchell and Mulherin (1989) find 
that only a small percentage of corporate takeovers lead to a termination of a pension fund.  In a 
similar vein, Pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) report that only 15% of hostile takeover bids 
and 8% of friendly takeover bids result in a pension fund termination.  Rosett (1990) analyzes the 
                                                 
2 Baldwin (1998) reports similar findings based on Canadian data, finding that mergers in Canada had a negative impact 
on employment and compensation of non-production workers. 
3 Marsh, Siegel, and Simons (2007) explore the consequences of Swedish mergers and acquisitions for women and 
minority employees.   7 
question of whether takeovers result in labor contract settlements that favor management, as opposed 
to workers.  He finds that takeover activity is unrelated to wage growth.  Most importantly, in 
contrast to the Shleifer and Summers (1988) hypothesis, he concludes that the gains to shareholders 
arising from corporate takeovers do not appear to be the result of losses to employees. 
In order to provide more direct and comprehensive evidence on the wage and employment 
effects of mergers and acquisitions, we now present an empirical analysis based on worker-level 
data.  The next section describes our econometric model, as well as other empirical issues.   
 
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
 
  To analyze how mergers and acquisitions relate to employment and earnings, we estimate 
earnings  equations,  the  probability  of  employment,  and  the  probability  of  different  types  of 
employment (self-employment versus organizational employment).     
  The benchmark model that that we estimate is:  
(1) ln (EARNiet+1)= + β ln (EARNiet-1) + γMAt + δINDIVit-1 + φPLANTet-1 + λt  + εit 
where α is an intercept term, EARN denotes the annual earnings of individual i who worked at time 
t-1 in plant e, MAt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plant experiences a merger or acquisition in 
year t or 0 otherwise, INDIVit is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, PLANTet is a vector 
of plant-specific characteristics, δ and φ are vectors of coefficients, λt is a year-specific fixed effect, 
and εit is the remaining classical disturbance term.     The dependent variable is earnings following 
merger or acquisition, in the year t+1.  All the right-hand-side variables are measured during the year 
before a merger or acquisition (t-1), except the dummy variable denoting whether the plant was 
involved  in  a  merger  or  acquisition,  which  is  assessed  at  time  t.    That  is  because  a  merger  or   8 
acquisition can occur at any point during year t, while the other variables are calculated at the end of 
the calendar year (at the same specific point in time).      
  Individual-specific variables in equation (1) include indicators of human capital investment 
(education, age, and experience) and other relevant characteristics. Equation (1) also incorporates 
several plant-level variables that have been shown to influence compensation, such as plant size and 
age.    Finally,  we  also  control  for  industry  and  location,  since  there  is  substantial  variation  in 
compensation across industries and regions.   
INDIVit,  the  vector  of  individual-specific  factors,  includes  dummy  variables  for  gender, 
national origin, age, categories of educational attainment, field of education, location, and industry 
of occupation, along with a continuous measure of the employee’s experience.  The plant-specific 
variables, PLANTet, are the age, size (as measured by both the logarithm of employment and the 
logarithm  of  total  sales),  and  average  employee  earnings  of  the  plant.    Industry  dummies  are 
included at the employee level, allowing industrial occupation to differ among workers in each plant. 
We also wish to estimate the relationship between ownership change and employment status 
following these transactions for different types of mergers and acquisitions.  To assess this issue, we 
estimate a multinomial logit equation of the following form:  
(2) Prob(EMPSTATUSiet+1 = j) = ￿  + ￿  ln(EARNiet-1) + ￿ MAt + ￿ INDIVit-1 + ￿ PLANTet-1 + ￿ t  + 
￿ it, 
where  EMPSTATUSiet+1  =  j  refers  to  whether  the  employment  status  equals  j  in  year  t+1  for 
individual i who was employed in plant e as of year t-1, and the other variables are defined as in 
equation (1).  There are three possible employment statuses: a worker can be employed by the 
original or acquiring organization, employed by another organization, or unemployed.  Note that as   9 
in the earnings equation, we assume that employment status is related to a set of individual, plant, 
and industry-level factors. 
   
IV. DATA  
  Our primary data source is linked, longitudinal employer-employee data on Swedish workers 
and plants that employ them.  This file contains annual information on all Swedish employees for the 
years  1985  to  1998,  consisting  of  over  36  million  observations,  representing  an  average  of  2.6 
million workers per year.  Establishment level data are also available for the majority of employees 
if  and  when  they  were  employed  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  so  that  9,251,962  records  have 
matching information available regarding the employee’s plant (and usually firm) workplace. 
The database facilitates our investigation of employment status and earnings.  Employment is 
recorded each year in November, and given that the database covers all employees, we infer that a 
worker whose record is missing in a given year was not employed in Sweden during that year.  A 
Annual earnings are recorded from employees’ official tax filings, and are composed of earnings 
paid by an organization plus self-employment and other earnings.
4   
For individual employees, we have data on gender, national origin, age, geographic location, 
year of last educational exam, categorical variables for educational attainment and field of education, 
and 5-digit SIC industry classification of employment.  In a previous paper (Siegel, Simons, and 
Lindstrom (2007)), we used parts of this information to construct plant-level measures of workforce 
characteristics, such as the percentage of workers who are female, the percentage who were born in 
Sweden  versus  immigrated,  the  mean  age  of  employees,  mean  experience  as  proxied  by  years 
elapsed since last year of education, and the percentage of employees with at least some college-
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, we do not have data on hours worked or hourly wages, only annual total income, for specific employees.   10 
level education.  Here we use the employee-specific data in each year as controls and to check for 
possible differences in effects of mergers and acquisitions across different types of people. 
Each record contains data on gender and national origin.  The national origin is based on 
their birthplace, which is listed as being Sweden, other Nordic countries, the remainder of Europe, 
and  five  other  world  regions  (Asia,  Africa,  North  America,  South  America,  and  other  nations).  
Employees’  geographic  locations,  available  for  99.6%  of  records,  correspond  to  338  local 
governments.    Educational  attainment  and  broad  field  of  educational  are  likewise  recorded 
categorically, and are available for 97% of records.  Attainment is categorized as 0-8 years, 9-10 
years  (obligatory  in  Sweden),  11-12  years,  13-14  years  (equivalent  to  a  normal  high  school 
education  similar  to  U.S.  grade  twelve),  college  or  university  education  for  one  to  two  years 
(including extended high school engineering programs), college or university education for three or 
more years but not PhD education, or PhD education.  Field of education is categorized as basic 
(general) education; esthetics, language, and religion; pedagogy; trade, office, economic, social, and 
behavioral  degrees;  industry-relevant  education  including  handcrafts,  engineering,  mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, and biology; transportation and communication; caring including nursing, child 
care, and geriatric care; farming, gardening, forestry, and fishing; general service skills including 
private guards and military service; or other areas of education.  
 The data record the year of an employee’s last educational examination in 45% of records, 
and a proxy for employee work experience is constructed in these cases as the logarithm of the 
number of years (including the last educational year) since finishing education.  This proxy for 
experience is likely to be an adequate control despite the paucity of information on educational 
examination year, because examination year information is mainly lacking among older employees, 
for whom age dummies (also included as control variables) provide a good proxy for experience.    11 
Interactions of the experience proxy with gender and national origin allow for differences in career 
paths, including the probability of working in each year following the employee’s last exam year.  
The employee’s current industry classification, available in 97.6% of records, divides employees 
into one of 1,092 categories based on either 1969 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
used where available, or 1992 SIC codes, used in later years.  Given that 1969 and 1992 industrial 
classifications  cannot  be  matched  precisely,  separate  categories  are  used  for  1969  versus  1992 
industry codes.
5  Categorical variables (gender, national origin, geographic locations, educational 
attainment,  field  of  education,  and  industry)  are  represented  in  our  analyses  using  0-1  dummy 
variables. 
Although employee, plant, or firm data are missing for some observations, we do not exclude 
any records from the sample on the basis of missing data, to avoid any potential sample selection 
bias.  Instead, we set the values of missing variables equal to the population mean or zero, and add 
dummy variables that equal one when the relevant type of data is unavailable or zero otherwise.  
Hence all these variables are used as controls to the full extent possible, while records with missing 
observations are allowed a constant shift parameter in case they differ on average from records with 
available information. 
The data on individual manufacturing employees were linked to data at the plant level.
6  The 
plant-level  data  provide  a  means  to  control  for  potentially  important  effects  of  plant-related 
                                                 
5 This makes the industry categories perfectly multi-collinear with the year-specific dummy variables, requiring that an 
appropriately chosen dummy variable be dropped from the model, with the ramification that estimated coefficients of 
year and industry dummy variables cannot be construed to have their obvious meanings and hence are not reported but 
simply used as controls. 
6 Consistent with conventional international standards, the plant or establishment is defined as a physically independent 
unit within a firm.  Each plant is assumed to focus on one industry.  Firms that are involved in multiple activities at the 
same physical address report separate figures for each activity, which are then assigned to a separate facility.  In most 
cases, however, firms focus on a single activity, implying that the local units are seldom split into several plants.  Plants 
that were considered to be “non-active” and “help plants,” such as sales offices (or what would be considered “auxiliary” 
establishments in the U.S.), were also excluded from the data.   12 
characteristics on earnings.  Moreover, the measures of ownership change used here depend on the 
plant-level data. 
  Employment status is measured as follows.  Individuals were defined to have maintained their 
existing  employment  if  they  were  employed  in t+1  at  the  same  plant  as  in  t-1  or  if  they  were 
employed in another plant owned by either their original employer or by the acquirer of their original 
plant.  Employees were defined to have found new employment if they reported employment in any 
other firm.  The remaining individuals are classified as unemployed.
7   
  From the overall data, we constructed a sample consisting of all manufacturing employees 
who  were  about  to  experience  ownership  change,  plus  a  similar  number  of  observations  of 
manufacturing employees who were not destined to experience an ownership change.  The sample 
includes all observations in which an employee i worked in plant e in the year t-1 (≤1996) before 
that  plant  experienced  a  merger  or  acquisition  in  year  t,  along  with  information  about  the 
corresponding employment status and earnings in corresponding year t+1.  The sample also includes 
a 5.5% probability sample of remaining observations (again for t-1 ≤ 1996), yielding roughly equal 
numbers of observations in which merger or acquisition was experienced, versus not experienced. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table 2 presents some statistics on the incidence of ownership change during the sample 
period (1985-1998).  Specifically, we report the percentage of plants whose parent companies were 
involved in a merger or acquisition.  These percentages are reported for all transactions and then by 
type  of  acquisition  or  divestiture,.    The  data  enable  us  to  identify  whether  an  acquisition  or 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the employees who found new jobs or became unemployed were not necessarily fired.  These 
employees may simply have found another job, retired, or left their previous job for any number of personal reasons.   13 
divestiture involves the buying or selling of an entire firm.  We also weighted each transaction by 
value-added and employment (not reported on the table) and found that rates of plant turnover are 
slightly higher when they are weighted.   
Table  2  indicates  that  5.1  %  of  plants  experienced  at  least  one  ownership  change.    An 
analysis of the annual figures reveals that the incidence of ownership change appears to have risen 
during the late 1980s, reaching a peak in the early 1990s.  Note that the overwhelming majority of 
such  changes  are  full  acquisitions  or  divestitures,  although  the  relative  importance  of  such 
transactions diminishes when they are weighted by value-added or employment (not reported in the 
table).  The full and partial acquisition categories indicate whether all or part of a firm is acquired: 
4.2% of plants in a year change owner as part of a full-firm takeover, and 0.9% change owner 
through a part-firm takeover, summing to the total annual figure of 5.1%.  The full and partial 
divestiture categories indicate whether the original owner cedes ownership of all versus some plants 
in a firm, regardless of the new owner(s) of those plants.  Related acquisitions are those where the 
buyer has an existing plant in the same (4-digit) industry.  Unrelated acquisitions involve a buyer 
whose existing establishments are in other industries.  The remaining set of ownership changes are 
referred to as “one-firm” acquisitions, since they involve a buyer who does not own an existing plant 
and hence, was not a known firm. 
Next, we make use of the individual-level data, in order to track the movement and relative 
compensation of workers whose establishments were involved in merger or acquisition.  In Tables 3-
8, we identify workers at the end of year T-1 and assess their employment status and earnings 
growth, respectively, at the end of year T+1 (the year after a merger or acquisition).
8  Within each 
                                                 
8 The focus on years T-1 and T+1, rather than a timeframe of a single year, is necessitated by the timing of when 
ownership changes occur and when employee information is reported.  Recall that employee information pertains to 
November, while a merger or acquisition can occur at any time during the reporting year.  If years T-1 and T were used,   14 
panel, rows pertain to employees’ future job status: workers could be employed at the same plant, at 
another plant owned by the previous owner, at another plant owned by the new owner, at another 
firm, in an unknown industry or plant (which likely includes workers who become self-employed or 
who are employed at an entrepreneurial startup), or they could be unemployed.  In each of these 
tables, we present descriptive statistics for plants not involved in a merger or acquisition (column 1), 
those whose parent company was involved in such an event (column 2), and then separately for all 
the  different  types  of  mergers  or  acquisitions  mentioned  earlier.    Turnover  findings  are  also 
presented separately for different types of workers.   
First, we present results for all employees (Tables 3 and 6) and then separately by gender 
(Tables 3 and 6), experience (Tables 4 and 7), and level of education (Tables 5 and 8).  Table 3 
indicates that mergers and acquisitions are associated with an increase in worker turnover at plants 
and firms.  For example, only 62.7% of the workers observed the year before a merger or acquisition 
were still employed at the same establishment a year after the transaction, compared to 72.9% for 
workers whose plants were not involved in a deal.  Males (Table 3) and less experienced workers 
(Table 4) were less likely than representative workers to remain at the same plant in the aftermath of 
an ownership change.  Workers with the highest levels of education (Table 5) had the greatest 
mobility across firms.   
Two-year mean earnings growth rates for the same groups of workers are presented in Tables 
6-8.  Women (Table 6) and less experienced workers (Table 7) experienced relatively high mean 
wage growth, yielding partial wage convergence with their male and more experienced counterparts.  
More highly educated employees (Table 8), with a high-school or especially a university education, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
it would be possible that a merger or acquisition could have occurred after the employee data were received in year T 
(not to mention that new owners policies may take some time to come into effect).  If years T and T+1 were used, the 
employee’s initial status normally would be recorded after a merger or acquisition occurred rather than before.   15 
experienced higher mean earnings growth.  These results should be interpreted with caution because 
we do not have individual-specific information on hours worked.  For example, it could be that 
women (who could be more likely to work part-time) worked more hours in the aftermath of merger 
or acquisition. 
Earnings growth was low, relative to the norm, for employees who left an establishment that 
experienced a merger or acquisition.  Employees who remained at the same plant experienced 10.6% 
mean  wage  growth  if  their  establishment  was  involved  in  a  merger  or  acquisition,  while  those 
workers whose plants were not sold experienced 12.6% mean wage growth.  Similarly, employees 
who moved to another firm in the same industry had only 37.1% mean wage growth if they began in 
an establishment that experienced a merger or acquisition, versus 52.0% mean wage growth if they 
began in establishments that did not experience a merger or acquisition.  This difference may reflect 
lower  average  human  capital  among  leaving  employees,  as  well  as  possible  difficulties  of  job 
changes triggered by mergers and acquisitions. 
Next, we focus on differences across types of mergers and acquisitions.  Table 3 indicates 
that worker turnover rates are lower for partial acquisitions and divestitures, with little difference 
between related and unrelated acquisitions.   These patterns are quite robust when we disaggregate 
our analysis by gender (Table 3), experience (Table 4), and level of education (Table 5).   Table 6 
indicates that wage growth is higher for workers whose plants experienced a partial acquisition or 
divestiture, as opposed to a full acquisition or divestiture, and substantially higher for unrelated 
acquisitions, relative to related acquisitions.  Once again, these patterns are largely consistent when 
we disaggregate by gender (Table 6), experience (Table 7), and level of education (Table 8).   
Although the descriptive patterns presented in Tables 3-8 are interesting, they do not include 
controls for the determinants of changes in earnings and worker mobility.  Table 9 presents OLS   16 
estimates of earnings, based on the specification outlined in equation (1).  Column (1) contains the 
base estimates, including a dummy variable for all mergers and acquisitions.  In columns (2)-(5), we 
test for differential effects by adding an interaction term for each type of merger or acquisition 
separately, while in the final column, we include all these dummy variables.  Similar results are 
presented in Table 10, except that each variant of the regression includes interactions of the M&A 
dummies with gender and national origin (not shown in the table).   
Consistent with the theory of human capital, we find that the coefficients on lagged earnings 
and a set of dummy variables for post-secondary education (not shown in the table) are all positive 
and highly statistically significant.
9  Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the experience term 
is  negative  and  significant.    However,  the  coefficient  on  the  quadratic  term  is  positive  and 
significant, implying a U-shaped relation of earnings to experience with a minimum at the 25th year 
of experience.  We also find that on average, women earn 19.5% less than men, controlling for the 
above variables plus location, industry, age, education, experience, and plant characteristics.   
We  now  focus  our  attention  on  the  coefficients  of  the  mergers  and  acquisitions  dummy 
variables (column 1) and the interaction terms relating to different types of transactions (columns 2-
6).  Consistent with previous plant-level studies (e.g., Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2007)), we 
find that mergers and acquisitions are associated with a decline in earnings.  On average, there 
appears to be a 1.5% reduction in post-merger or -acquisition earnings.  Recall that we can also 
identify whether the plant was involved in a full or partial acquisition or divestiture, as well as a 
related or unrelated acquisition.   
The empirical evidence suggests that employee outcomes are more favorable when only part 
of  the  company  is  bought  or  sold  or  when  the  firm  engages  in  an  unrelated  acquisition.    We 
                                                 
9 We estimated a variant of the model with the coefficient on lagged earnings constrained to be one, which is equivalent 
to estimating an earnings growth equation.  This had no discernable effect on our econometric results.   17 
conducted parametric tests for differences between partial and full acquisitions or divestitures, as 
well as related and unrelated acquisitions, and found that all were significant at the .01 level (not 
shown on the table).  The findings also suggest that relative earnings decline the most for employees 
who worked at a plant that was sold to a new owner that did not previously own a (manufacturing) 
establishment.    Most  of  the  coefficient  estimates  for  specific  types  of  mergers  and  acquisitions 
remain constant when all types are included in the regression (column 6), the exception being partial 
divestitures.  Although partial divestitures initially appear (in column 3) to be associated with a 
statistically significant 0.6% increase in earnings, the estimate falls to a statistically insignificant 
0.1% (in column 6); apparently the benefit is really driven by partial acquisitions or other correlated 
types of ownership transactions.  As shown in Table 10, the findings are robust (although some point 
estimates change) when we include interaction terms for the MA dummies with gender and national 
origin in the same set of regressions.   
Next, we focus on another dependent variable: employment status.  Recall that there are three 
possible employment outcomes: a worker can be employed by the original or acquiring organization, 
employed by another organization, or unemployed.  These multinomial logit regression findings are 
presented in Table 11.  The regressions include the same control variables as for Table 10.  In the 
multinomial logit regressions, the base case is being employed by the same firm or by the new 
owner.  In Columns (1) and (2), the effects of mergers and acquisitions are constrained to be the 
same for all mergers and acquisitions, while in the remaining columns, the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions are allowed to differ for different types of transactions.  
The results in Table 11 suggest that the probabilities of moving to another firm or becoming 
unemployed are inversely related to earnings, and inversely related to experience until about the 15th 
year of experience.  We also find that women are less likely, ceteris paribus, to leave the firm or   18 
become  unemployed.    On  the  other  hand,  mergers  and  acquisitions  significantly  increase  the 
likelihood of inter-firm mobility and unemployment.  An inspection of the numerous interaction 
terms for different types of transactions reveals that these deleterious effects for employees are 
substantially mitigated for partial acquisitions and divestitures (after which relatively few workers 
become unemployed) and unrelated acquisitions (after which workers are more likely to switch jobs, 
but less likely to become unemployed).  It appears that the worst employee outcomes are observed in 
instances  when  a  plant  is  sold  to  an  owner  who  did  not  previously  own  a  (manufacturing) 
establishment.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has yielded some new evidence regarding the effects of different types of mergers 
and  acquisitions  on  employees.    Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  rich  matched  employer-
employee dataset, which combines data on millions of Swedish workers and information on 19,010 
Swedish manufacturing plants for the years 1985-1998.  Our analysis of these individual-level data 
allows  us  to  track  directly  the  movement  and  relative  compensation  of  workers  whose 
establishments were involved in mergers and acquisitions.  
For each worker, we have data on gender, age, national origin, level of education, type of 
education, location, industrial sector, and annual earnings, as well as each employee’s work history 
both before and after a merger or acquisition.  We can also identify whether the plant was involved 
in a full or partial acquisition or divestiture, as well as a related or unrelated acquisition. Thus, in 
contrast to most existing studies of the consequences of mergers and acquisitions, we have more 
detail on employee outcomes for different types of transactions.     19 
Several  stylized  facts  emerge  from  this  analysis.    The  empirical  evidence  suggests  that 
employee outcomes are more favorable when only part of the company is bought or sold, or when 
the firm engages in  an unrelated acquisition.  These results imply that human capital is valued 
differently by the new owners of establishments and firms, depending on the type of transaction.   
Specifically, it appears that new owners who have purchased a piece of a company (rather than an 
entire firm), or those who are using the purchase as a mechanism to enter a new industry, place a 
higher value on the plant’s existing stock of human capital than other types of owners.   
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Table 2 
Percentage of Manufacturing Plants Involved in a Merger or Acquisition (All M&A and by Type of M&A)  
During 1986-1998 (n=19,010) 





































1986  3.4%  2.6%  0.8%  2.7%  0.6%  0.5%  0.1%  2.7% 
1987  4.6%  3.7%  1.0%  4.0%  0.7%  0.5%  0.4%  3.7% 
1988  5.9%  4.4%  1.5%  4.7%  1.2%  0.7%  0.2%  5.0% 
1989  5.5%  4.5%  1.0%  4.7%  0.8%  0.9%  0.5%  4.1% 
1990  6.1%  4.7%  1.4%  5.4%  0.7%  1.2%  0.6%  4.3% 
1991  5.5%  4.0%  1.5%  4.7%  0.8%  1.0%  0.5%  4.0% 
1992  6.5%  5.4%  1.1%  5.6%  0.9%  1.2%  0.6%  4.7% 
1993  7.1%  6.3%  0.8%  6.5%  0.6%  1.4%  0.4%  5.3% 
1994  5.4%  4.7%  0.6%  4.9%  0.5%  1.0%  0.3%  4.0% 
1995  4.4%  3.9%  0.6%  4.0%  0.5%  0.8%  0.5%  3.1% 
1996  4.4%  3.9%  0.5%  4.0%  0.4%  1.0%  0.4%  3.0% 
1997  4.7%  4.0%  0.7%  4.1%  0.6%  0.9%  0.8%  3.1% 
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Table 3 
Employment Status of Plant Workers the Year After a Merger or Acquisition (All Employees and By Gender) 
 
All Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  72.9  62.7  65.5  71.5  65.5  71.4  68.0  67.0  60.2 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm    2.2    2.3    2.5    2.3    2.9     2.3    1.1    1.4    2.8 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm    0.0    2.4    2.1    0.1    2.3     0.1    2.9    2.2    2.3 
Another Firm  10.8  14.9  15.2  11.6  15.0   11.6  11.2  12.0  16.6 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.4    2.4    2.1    1.5    1.6     1.5   1.8    2.9    2.6 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  12.6  15.2  12.6  13.1  12.7  13.1  15.0  14.5  15.4 
 
 
Male Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  73.7  63.0  65.8  72.3  65.3  72.2  68.7  68.3  60.3 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm    2.2  2.4  2.6  2.3  3.1  2.3  1.2  1.5  3.0 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm    0.0  2.2  2.0  0.1  2.2  0.1  2.8  2.2  2.0 
Another Firm  11.2  15.9  15.8  11.9  15.9  12.1  11.7  12.2  17.7 
Unknown Industry or Plant     1.4  2.6  2.3  1.5  1.8  1.5  1.8  2.9  2.8 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  11.4  13.9  11.3  11.8  11.5  11.8  13.7  12.9  14.1 
 
Female Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  61.8  64.6  69.3  66.1  69.2  66.2  63.6  60.0  61.8 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.9  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  1.0  1.4  2.3  1.9 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  3.1  2.3  0.1  2.4  0.1  3.2  2.3  3.2  3.1 
Another Firm  12.3  12.4  10.2  12.7  10.2  9.6  11.3  13.5  12.3 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.9  1.6  1.4  1.0  1.4  1.7  2.6  1.9  1.9 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  18.8  16.0  16.8  15.7  16.8  18.3  18.8  19.0  18.8   25 
Table 4  
Employment Status of Plant Workers the Year After a Merger or Acquisition (Low vs. High Experience Workers)  
 
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean  
 
 




























Same Plant  61.3  53.4  56.7  60.2  56.5  60.1  57.4  56.5  51.5 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  2.1  1.7  1.7  2.2  1.7  2.2  1.2  1.4  2.0 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  0.0  2.3  2.2  0.1  2.4  0.1  2.4  1.9  2.4 
Another Firm  18.7  22.4  22.3  19.4  22.5  19.4  18.7  19.9  24.0 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.7  2.4  2.2  1.7  1.8  1.7  2.2  3.1  2.5 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  16.7  17.7  14.9  16.5  15.1  16.4  18.2  17.4  17.6 
 
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean  
 
 




























Same Plant  78.7  68.5  71.8  77.1  72.2  77.1  73.5  70.7  66.3 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  2.6  2.0  2.3  2.8  2.4  2.8  1.3  1.6  2.3 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  0.0  3.3  2.2  0.1  2.5  0.1  3.4  2.9  3.4 
Another Firm  9.9  14.3  14.8  10.8  14.9  10.8  11.4  13.0  15.7 
Unknown Industry or Plant  1.1  1.9  1.6  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.5  2.5  1.9 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  7.6  9.9  7.2  8.0  7.1  8.0  8.8  9.3  10.4 
 Table 5  
Employment Status of Plant Workers the Year After a Merger or Acquisition (For Various Level of Education)  
 
Employees With Less Than A High School Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  74.7  65.0  67.7  73.2  68.1  73.1  70.2  70.1  62.6 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.7  2.4  2.5  1.8  3.1  1.8  1.1  1.5  2.9 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  0.0  2.0  1.9  0.1  2.0  0.1  2.7  1.6  1.8 
Another Firm  7.7  11.1  11.4  8.6  10.8  8.6  7.8  7.7  12.7 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.3  2.4  2.2  1.4  1.7  1.4  1.6  2.4  2.6 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  14.3  17.2  14.2  14.9  14.2  14.9  16.6  16.7  17.4 
 
Employees With a High School Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  72.9  62.6  65.8  71.5  66.0  71.4  67.8  66.6  60.3 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.6  2.3  1.2  1.4  2.6 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  0.0  2.3  1.9  0.1  2.1  0.1  3.0  2.5  2.0 
Another Firm  11.8  16.1  16.5  9.5  16.0  12.5  12.5  12.8  17.9 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.4  2.4  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  3.1  2.6 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  11.7  14.2.  11.5  12.2  11.7  12.2  13.9  13.6  14.4 
 
Employees With At Least Some College or University Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  70.1  57.4  59.5  68.8  58.9  68.7  64.7  59.8  54.7 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  3.8  2.6  3.2  3.9  3.1  3.9  1.6  1.7  3.1 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  0.0  4.7  3.6  0.2  4.1  0.2  4.0  3.6  5.0 
Another Firm  15.3  22.1  23.0  16.1  23.7  16.2  17.0  21.8  23.8 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.4  2.4  1.8  1.4  1.3  1.4  2.6  2.9  2.2 
Unemployed (at least in Sweden)  9.3  10.8  8.9  9.5  8.8  9.5  10.1  10.2  11.1 
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Table 6 
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T 
 
All Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.126  1.106  1.097  1.126  1.116  1.125  1.090  1.127  1.110 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.168  1.066  1.056  1.161  1.055  1.161  1.055  1.143  1.062 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  1.297  1.203  1.113  1.252  1.114  1.236  1.075  1.127  1.268 
Another Firm  1.520  1.371  1.302  1.503  1.328  1.501  1.264  1.293  1.410 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.148  1.051  1.003  1.136  0.997  1.135  1.138  1.115  1.148 
 
Male Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.073  1.058  1.064  1.072  1.079  1.072  1.037  1.080  1.063 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.093  1.050  1.047  1.090  1.054  1.089  1.022  1.095  1.051 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.047  1.062  1.038  1.053  1.044  1.033  1.042  1.054 
Another Firm  1.390  1.294  1.231  1.377  1.244  1.375  1.218  1.211  1.324 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.132  1.024  1.014  1.119  1.014  1.118  0.990  1.054  1.027 
 
Female Employees  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.281  1.237  1.187  1.281  1.208  1.280  1.229  1.257  1.236 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.394  1.121  1.084  1.376  1.060  1.375  1.158  1.274  1.102 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  1.503  1.497  1.236  1.605  1.257  1.570  1.170  1.341  1.627 
Other Non-Mfg Industry, Other Firm  1.880  1.586  1.513  1.852  1.580  1.849  1.380  1.504  1.662 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.211  1.146  1.229  0.980  1.185  0.940  1.516  1.286  1.002 
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Table 7 
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T  
 
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.321  1.311  1.260  1.321  1.286  1.320  1.227  1.392  1.333 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.359  1.311  1.328  1.349  1.334  1.349  1.222  1.273  1.334 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.285  1.296  1.279  1.274  1.291  1.254  1.439  1.281 
Another Firm  1.685  1.528  1.453  1.676  1.448  1.674  1.422  1.573  1.557 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.387  1.192  1.356  1.250  1.353  1.722  1.363  1.284  1.387 
 
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.158  1.128  1.121  1.157  1.141  1.157  1.116  1.098  1.138 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.196  1.058  1.054  1.188  1.046  1.188  1.042  1.125  1.055 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.490  1.160  1.607  1.175  1.574  1.151  1.181  1.656 
Another Firm  1.329  1.218  1.294  1.312  1.346  1.311  1.136  1.123  1.255 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.120  0.975  0.977  1.102  0.881  1.102  0.941  1.088  0.963 
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Table 8 
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T  
 
Employees With Less Than A High School Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.070  1.059  1.050  1.069  1.067  1.069  1.047  1.151  1.049 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.115  1.016  0.985  1.106  0.992  1.106  1.025  1.146  1.006 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.030  1.061  1.011  1.061  1.018  0.995  1.026  1.049 
Another Firm  1.222  1.127  1.134  1.193  1.147  1.192  1.114  1.053  1.132 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.086  0.998  0.977  1.076  0.954  1.075  0.940  1.137  0.993 
 
Employees With a High School Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.157  1.126  1.129  1.156  1.150  1.155  1.121  1.107  1.131 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.179  1.097  1.069  1.174  1.067  1.174  1.100  1.125  1.095 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.351  1.142  1.455  1.135  1.427  1.131  1.157  1.494 
Another Firm  1.262  1.177  1.174  1.241  1.185  1.240  1.138  1.156  1.183 
Unknown Industry or Plant   1.045  1.030  1.174  1.018  1.173  0.995  1.129  1.042  1.045 
 
Employees With At least Some College or University Education  
 
 




























Same Plant  1.177  1.191  1.116  1.179  1.131  1.179  1.088  1.117  1.242 
Another Plant Owned By Same Firm  1.211  1.101  1.165  1.203  1.196  1.202  0.995  1.236  1.109 
Another Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm  N/A  1.193  1.158  1.209  1.174  1.200  1.119  1.210  1.210 
Another Firm  1.463  1.316  1.286  1.450  1.310  1.449  1.186  1.178  1.365 







Table 9    
OLS Estimates of Earnings Equations  

















Log (t-1) Earnings  
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
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(0.003) 
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(0.003) 
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(0.003) 




   -0.003*** 
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   -0.195*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.002) 
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(0.002) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.002) 




   -0.015*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.018*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.017*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.017*** 
(0.001) 
 
MAt*PartialAcq   
     0.007*** 
(0.002) 
           0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 
MAt *PartialDivest   
       0.006*** 
(0.002) 
    0.001 
(0.003) 
 
MAt*UnrelatedAcq   
          0.014*** 
(0.004) 
       0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
MAt*SingleFirm   
           -0.018*** 
(0.003) 





     5.732*** 
(0.112) 
      5.732*** 
(0.112) 
      
5.734*** 
(0.112) 
      5.736*** 
(0.112) 
      5.733*** 
(0.112) 




2  0.471  0.471  0.471  0.471  0.472  0.473 
 
Notes: N=719,847. Controls include dummies for worker education, worker age, worker national origin, plant age, 
worker location, interactions of experience and experience squared with worker national origin, plant size, plant 
mean earnings, and industry.  All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that the merger or acquisition is 
observed at t.  Our dependent variable is observed at t+1.  †p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed 







Table 10    
OLS Estimates of Earnings Equations  
                                 Dependent Variable: Log Earnings the Year After A Merger or Acquisition  

















Log (t-1) Earnings  
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 
     0.556*** 
(0.003) 




   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 



















   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 





















   -0.195*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.195*** 
(0.003) 




   -0.015*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.015*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.012*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.015*** 
(0.002) 
 
MAt*PartialAcq   
     0.007*** 
(0.002) 
            0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 
MAt* PartialDivest   
       0.006*** 
(0.002) 
    0.001 
(0.003) 
 
MAt*UnrelatedAcq   
         0.014*** 
    (0.004) 
       0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
MAt * SingleFirm   
         -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
 
Constant         5.732*** 
(0.112) 
      
5.728*** 
(0.112) 
      
5.731*** 
(0.112) 
      
5.730*** 
(0.112) 
      
5.729*** 
(0.112) 




2  0.471  0.471  0.471  0.471  0.472  0.473 
 
 
Notes: N=719,847. Controls include dummies for worker education, worker age, national origin of worker, plant 
age, worker location, interactions of experience and experience squared with worker national origin, plant size, plant 
mean earnings, and industry.  Controls also include interactions of the merger and acquisition dummies with worker 
national origin and gender.  All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that the merger or acquisition is 
observed at t.  Our dependent variable is observed at t+1.  †p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed 




                                Table 11  
Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of the  




















































































  -0.030*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.029*** 
(0.002) 









   .001*** 
(0.000) 
    .001*** 
(0.000) 
    .001*** 
(0.000) 
   .001*** 
(0.000) 
     .001*** 
(0.000) 
     .001*** 
(0.000) 
     .001*** 
(0.000) 


















  -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
     .001*** 
(0.000) 



























    -0.354*** 
(0.015) 














  -0.351*** 
(0.015) 




   0.518*** 
(0.009) 














   0.390*** 
(0.014) 
    0.371*** 
(0.015) 
 
MAt*PartialAcq   




         0.022 
(0.017) 
    -0.420*** 
(0.019) 
MAt* 
PartialDivest   




      -0.231*** 
(0.018) 
     0.179*** 
(0.021) 
MAt* 
UnrelatedAcq   









SingleFirm   
          0.140*** 
(0.019) 
   0.190*** 
(0.021) 
   0.169*** 
(0.019) 
     0.236*** 
(0.021) 
     Psuedo R
2     .173    .172    .172    .172    .172 
 
Notes: N=804,535. Controls include dummies for worker education, worker age, worker region of national origin at birth, plant age, worker location, interactions 
of experience and experience squared with worker region of national origin at birth, plant size, plant mean earnings, and industry.  Controls also include 
interactions of merger or acquisition with worker region of national origin at birth and with gender.  All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that 
ownership change is observed at t.  Our dependent variable is observed at t+1  †p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed significance levels using 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 